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Antisocial Behaviour 
One of the most difficult issues facing housing 
authorities is its potential liability to third parties for 
what is commonly referred to as the "antisocial 
behaviour" of its local authority tenants, or those living 
in accommodation under licence from the local 
authority. The term is now defined by s.1 of the 
Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997 as 
drug-related activity andlor: 
. . . any behaviour which causes or is likely to 
cause any significant or persistent danger, 
injuly, damage, loss or fear to any person living 
working or otherwise lawfully in or in the vicinity 
of a house provided by a housing 
authority.. .and.. .includes violence, threats, 
intimidation, coercion, harassment or serious 
obstruction of any person. 
The problem is not unique to housing authorities and 
is part of the broader legal question of the liability of 
landlords for the acts and omissions of their tenants. 
Examples include innocuous activities such as the 
parking of cars in awkward places, the dumping of 
rubbish in gardens, noise (particularly late at night), 
aggressive dogs, as well conduct which involves 
serious criminality such as drug uselsupply and 
assault.' As is noted by one commentator, local 
authorities' duties may not simply extend to its tenants: 
"Anti-social behaviour sits at a strange 
juncture in the law. Maybe this is because of 
the many forms that takes- noise nuisance, 
fouling public areas, aggressive and violent 
conduct. Some of this is simply non- 
neighbourly whereas some is quite clearly 
criminal. The legal responses to anti-social 
Neil Maddoxf, BL behaviour also takes many forms, but the main 
focus-notwithstanding that anti-social 
behaviour affects the whole community-has 
been to see it as a problem to be tackled by 
local authorities wearing their 'housing 
management' hat. The focus on the housing 
dimension may well have fed the notion that it 
is council tenants who cause anti-social 
behaviour, and council tenants alone who the 
local authority are responsible to, and for. 
Chadwick L.J. observed in Northampton BC 
v. Lovatt [ I  9981 1 EGLR 15 that "reasonably 
or unreasonably . . . those who live or work on 
a council estate and are affected by the 
conduct of council tenants on that estate will 
expect the council to do something about it. 
The housing department will receive 
complaints which will have to be addres~ed."~ 
The Liability of Local Authorities 
The extent of a local authority's obligations for the 
"anti-social" behaviour of its tenants is ill-defined and 
claims are grounded in a number of areas of law, 
e.g, nuisance, negligence, a breach of statutory duty, 
and landlord and tenant law. As is noted below, there 
are compelling policy reasons for not imposing duties 
for such behaviour upon local authorities as they have 
a statutory duty to house eligible applicants, 
Furthermore, the question arises as to why the cost 
of stopping any nuisance should fall on a landlord 
where it has done nothing to encourage the 
behavioura3 
However, from the viewpoint of a claimant there 
can be a superficial attractiveness to pursuing the 
landlord in such cases, as opposed to, or in addition 
to, the person causing the nuisance. Where social 
housing is involved the tenant defendants may be 
men and women of straw, thus negating the value of 
any remedy in damages obtainable against themn4 A 
damages award against a landlord, however, would 
not only compensate the claimant but encourage 
them to take steps to end the nuisance by seeking 
repossession of the property from the troublesome 
tenant. Furthermore, as one commentator notes: 
". . . it is credible for a claimant in this position, 
whose primary concern will be to get the 
nuisance to stop, to assume that the result is 
more likely to be achieved by a court granting 
a possession order to a landlord than by 
granting the claimant an injunction against the 
other tenant and then committing the tenant 
for contempt if the terms of the injunction are 
breached. Even if those draconian 
consequences did ensue, and courts are 
notoriously reluctant to gaol defendants in 
such circumstances ... the imprisonment 
would be temporary and the neighbour would 
remain in possession of her premises with the 
prospect that helshe would continue the 
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nuisance in the future. An enforced possession 
order granted to the landlord would of course 
remove that p~ssibilily.~ 
Local authorities are seen in the eyes of potential 
claimants of having significant financial resources- 
a "deep-pocket" defendant for whom insolvency is 
not an option and who will always be there.%s noted 
above, the ability to recover against a more culpable 
defendant may be worthless in practice, and under 
the rules of joint and several liability, the whole of the 
award may be recovered from one defendant 
irrespective of their share of responsibility. 
Despite the fact that a local authority has statutory 
powers to tackle anti-social behaviour, they do not 
necessarily have a legal responsibility to do so.7 A 
local authority's responsibilities emanate from two 
sources. First, if the local authority is in some way 
responsible for the behaviour in question. Such 
responsibility need not be from positive acts of the 
authority and may result from omissions. So, for 
example, the failure to remove those committing the 
antisocial behaviour from the land over a period of 
time may, in certain cases, be sufficient to argue a 
breach of duty. Second, an "expectation" responsibility 
can be generated through assurances given by the 
authority or from the nature of a particular relationship, 
e.g. a promise that the authori,ky will take legal action 
to resolve the matter.8 
Justiciability 
Many housing authorities (and all local authorities) 
are public a~thorities.~ The fact that such authorities 
may be seeking to discharge their liability to the public 
as a whole will be highly relevant in determining the 
liability of the authority for the acts of third parties. 
Such authori.ties are distinct from private landowners 
in that they are often under a statutory duty to provide 
housing in particular areas. The presence of antisocial 
tenants often leaves an authority between the 
proverbial "rock and a hard place". 
Both options that are available-i.e. either to allow 
such tenants to continue to reside in an area where 
they have created disturbance, or moving these 
tenants to another area to create a inevitable 
disturbance in that area-potentially leaving the 
authority open to litigation for the acts of these third 
parties. Failure to provide any housing or site facilities 
for the tenants will leave the authority vulnerable to 
accusations that it has failed to perform its statutory 
housing function. Indeed, it may be compelled to do 
so in the courts. In such circumstances: it may not be 
appropriate that these matters be dealt with at all by 
the courts. Booth and Squire note that in England 
and Wales the cases in which local authorities have 
been liable for the behaviour of third party occupiers 
of land were those in which the authority did not have 
any policy for dealing with the nuisances and had 
done nothing to deal with anti-social behaviour and, 
furtheri0: 
"Where the decision as to whether to remove 
an individual from land involves a 'weighing 
of resources and the establishment of 
priorities', and it is essentially a decision of 
housing or land use policy, it will be beyond 
the competence of the court to adjudicate upon 
It, and the decision cannot give rise to a claim 
in damages ... When the local authority has 
formulated a strategy that attempts to balance 
the rights of different parties and the wider 
community, it is unlikely that a court will 
interfere with its decision or conclude that it 
has been negligently taken."ll 
Claims for the misbehaviour of third parties tend to 
fall into three categories: 1) Nuisance, 2) Negligence, 
and 3) Derogation from grant. Claims in nuisance will 
seek to establish 1) that the acts of the occupiers of 
land interfered with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment 
of the land, 2) that they arose from the use of the 
defendant's land, 3) that they were expressly or 
impliedly authorised by the defendant. Nuisance need 
not, of course, amount to, or be limited to, anti-social 
behaviour. The elements of the tort were set down 
by OIHiggins C.J. in Connolly v South of Ireland 
Asphalt12: 
"It has been said that an actionable nuisance 
is incapable of exact definition. The term 
nuisance contemplates an act or omission 
which amounts to an unreasonable 
interference with, disturbance of, or 
annoyance to another person in the exercise 
of his rights. If the rights so interfered with 
belong to the person as a member of the 
public, the act or omission is a public nuisance. 
If these rights relate to the ownership or 
occupation of land, or of some easement. 
profit, or other right enjoyed in connection with 
land, then the acts or omissions amount to a 
private nuisance."'' 
Private nuisance is actionable per se, i.e. there is no 
need for proof of actual damage and may constitute 
i~ physical damage to land, ii) interference with the 
enjoyment of land, or iii) interference with servitudes 
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such as easements.14 
In cases where the housing authority has not 
created the nuisance the court may still fix it with 
liability if it "adopts" or "continues" the nuisance. 
However, this is limited to cases where the nuisance 
is caused by the act of a third party licenseel 
trespasser upon the authority's land. Nor does 
continuance require active participation by the 
housing authority. A failure to take steps to end the 
nuisance within a reasonable time from becoming 
aware of it may be sufficient to constitute 
continuance.15 Furthermore, as is evident from the 
discussion below, a housing authority may be liable 
for acts of third parties which are committed away 
from the property in which the authority has an interest 
if they are using such property as their base.16 
Negligence claims tend to focus on the denial of a 
duty of care by the authority and where such a duty 
is arguable the case can often concern the liability 
for an omission, e.g, where there has been a failure 
to evict the tenants after the anti-social behaviour has 
been brought to the attention of the authority. 
A derogation from grant can be established where 
a landlord grants a right to a tenant (either expressly 
or by implication) and the landlord's subsequent acts 
or omissions negate that right. The passage of the 
European Human Rights Act 2003 also allows 
potential claims for breach of the provisions 
thereunder. 
Nuisance 
Caused by Housing Authority Tenants 
In cases against housing authorities for a nuisance 
caused by a third party, there appears a distinction in 
the English case law between nuisances caused by 
tenants and nuisances caused by other third parties 
such as licensees or trespassers over the Authority's 
property. 
Smith v Scoff7 sets down the rule governing the 
liability of a housing authority where one of their 
tenants is causing the nuisance complained of. In 
this case the local authority placed a family in a house 
adjoining the plaintiff as tenant. The family were 
known by the authority to be likely to cause a 
nuisance, but the conditions of tenancy contained an 
express term which prohibited committing a nuisance. 
It stated: 
"[The tenants shall] be responsible for the 
orderly conduct of all persons (including their 
children) who occupy the premises, their own 
and other occupants' visitors on any part of 
the estate ... 
[The tenants shall not] overcrowd the premises 
or do or permit or suffer anything to be dore 
on the premises which in the opinion of tnc 
council may be or become a nuisance or 
annoyance to other persons. 
The tenant shall be responsible for ensuring 
that members of his family, his visitors and 
other persons who occupy the premises or any 
part thereof comply with conditions ... [set 
down] hereof and accordingly any 
infringement of such conditions by such 
persons will be deemed to be and be treated 
as an infringement thereof by the tenant," 
The tenants damaged the plaintiff's property and 
caused excess noises and he was obliged to leave 
his house and seek alternative accommodation. The 
plaintiff sought inter alia an injunction against the 
corporation from "allowing or permitting" the tenants 
from doing the acts complained of. The council were 
found to have taken no effective steps to control the 
tenant's behaviour or to evict them. It was also found 
that the corporation had knowledge when they placed 
the tenants at the dwelling that they were likely to 
cause a nuisance, but there was no malice involved. 
The court noted that, in the law of nuisance, the 
person to be sued is the occupier of the property which 
creates the nuisance and a landlord is not generally 
liable for acts of nuisance committed by a tenant. The 
landlord is liable if he or she has authorised the 
nuisance.18 However, the exception is a narrow one 
as set down by Pennycuick V.C.: 
". . . this exception has, in the reported cases, 
been rigidly confined to circumstances in 
which the nuisance has been either expressly 
authorised or is certain to result from the 
purposes for which the propen'y is let . . . The 
exception is squarely based in the reported 
cases on express or implied authority .. . [It] is 
not based on cause and probable result, apart 
from express and implied authority."lg 
As the tenancy agreement contained an express term 
forbidding the conduct causing the nuisance, the 
corporation was held not to fall within this exception 
as it could not be said that the corporation impliedly 
assented to it. The fact that the letting of the house 
would probably lead to such a nuisance was not 
relevant in the absence of this assent. 
The rule in Rylands v FletchePO was also held 
inapplicable as the judge noted that the person liable 
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under it "is the owner or controller of the dangerous 
'thing' and this is normally the occupier and not the 
owner of the land ... a person parts with possession 
of the demised property in favour of his tenant and 
could not in any sense known to law be regarded as 
controlling the tenant . . . " . 2 1  Furthermore, the court 
did not believe that it was open to it to impose a duty 
of care upon a local authority to its neighbours when 
selecting tenants to let the property and the case was 
dismissed. 
Distinction between Acts of Tenants and Acts of 
Trespassers 
A different legal standard applies if the act causing 
the nuisance was caused by a licensee or trespasser, 
as opposed to a tenant of the authority. This is set 
down in the case of Sedleigh-Denfield v 
O'Callaghan.22 It states that a landlord who does not 
take reasonable steps to abate a nuisance caused 
by a third party within a reasonable time of becoming 
aware of it can be held liable. Lord Wright stated the 
law as follows where the nuisance was not caused 
by the defendant but he had "come to the nuisance" 
which may have been caused by a trespasser or 
stranger: 
"Then he is not liable unless he continued or 
adopted the nuisance, or more accurately, did 
not without undue delay remedy it when he 
became aware of it, or with ordinary and 
reasonable care should have become aware 
of it.'Iz3 
The case concerned a nuisance claim in respect of 
the physical condition of the land in question caused 
by a blockage to a rain water culvert. The blockage 
had been caused by a trespasser onto the 
defendant's land. However, the defendant was held 
liable for the damage caused to the adjoining land as 
there was ample time to fix the problem but he had 
failed to do so. The direct applicability of this case to 
claims involving the antisocial behaviour of their 
parties on a landlord's property has been 
q~es t ioned.~~ 
The case was cited in argument in Page Motors v 
Epsonf5 the plaintiffs were lessees of a premises from 
the defendant and conducted their business there. A 
gypsy community camped on a part of the estate close 
to the premises. They caused considerable nuisance 
and interfered significantly with the plaintiffs' business, 
The plaintiffs made a series of complaints to the 
defendant, and a court order of possession was 
obtained in 1974. However, it was not until 1978 that 
the site was finally cleared. It was found that the 
council had made a deliberate policy decision in 
allowing the gypsies continue in possession of the 
land and had provided them with facilities for the site. 
The defendant was held liable in nuisance and this 
was upheld by the Court of Appeal. There liability was 
held to run from the start of 1975. 
The court stated that the defendants had a duty to 
take reasonable steps to remove the cause of the 
nuisance to adjoining occupiers once they became 
aware of it within a reasonable time. The court further 
held that it was obliged to have regard to the fact that 
the defendant was a public body with a duty to 
consider wider issues which would not be necessary 
for a private body and had public responsibilities in 
the discharge of its function. It was held that if 
reasonable steps had been taken to remove the 
nuisance, it would have ceased by the beginning of 
1975. The decision of Smith v Scottwas distinguished 
by Ackner L.J. who noted that it was: 
". . . essentially a claim brought against a local 
authority on the basis that as landlords' they 
expressly or impliedly authorised the nuisance 
complained of. Sedleigh-Denfield v, 
OJCallaghan [I 9401 A.C. 880 does not appear 
to have been cited nor, apparently, was any 
point taken that the non-enforcement by the 
council of their covenant against the 
commission of a nuisance by their tenant could 
have resulted in their adopting his tortuous 
beha~iour. ' '~~ 
In Hussain v Lancaster City CounciP7 the plaintiffs 
owned a shop and residential property on a council 
housing estate. They were subjected to severe 
harassment (including racial harassment) from 
persons who were mostly council tenants. This 
included verbal threats, intimidating behaviour such 
as loitering at the property and serious criminal 
behaviour, namely an attempt to "burn them out" by 
placing mattresses against the door of the property 
and setting fire to them. The council had been made 
fully aware of the suffering inflicted on the plaintiffs 
from 1991 through various contacts made and 
through the local media. Notwithstanding this the 
council had failed to take any repossession 
proceedings against the perpetrators of the various 
forms of antisocial behaviour. Again the council's 
standard tenancy agreement provided that the tenant 
would show ,'proper consideration towards other 
residents In the area." 
H~rst L.J, upheld Smith v Scott as "good law" and 
rejected a submission that it had been overtaken by 
:: -. 5,ancng and Property Law b , r n a  - i 2 ' =  - ' ,-  2 -
the doctrine of "adoption" espoused in Page Motors. 
He distinguished that case as follows: 
"The conduct of the gypsies in the Page 
Motors case clearly constituted nuisance in 
the technical sense, since in all its various 
manifestations it involved use (or rather 
misuse) of the council's land which the gypsies 
had been occupying over a period of several 
years; on that footing alone it is plainly 
distinguishable from the present case. . . . the 
key to the case is the fact that ... the council 
deliberately continued the gypsies' possession 
of the land on policy grounds, and provided 
them with a water supply, skips etc. thus in 
effect adopting the gypsies nuisance. No 
similar adoption occurred in the present 
Hirst L.J. does not appear to regard Smith and Scott 
and Page Motors as incompatible. Rather, he takes 
a more restrictive view of the circumstances in which 
a landlord can "adopt the conduct" of the occupants 
of land. In Page Motors it was a deliberate decision 
of the council together with deliberate acts 
acquiescing and supporting the continuance of the 
gypsies in possession of the site and not simply 
inaction which led to the finding that the local authority 
was responsible in nuisance. On the interpretation of 
Hirst L.J. mere passive conduct such as the failure of 
a local authority to evict tenants engaged in antisocial 
behaviour would not be sufficient to render the council 
responsible in law to those neighbours. Afurtherfactor 
militating against the imposition of liability in this case 
was the fact that the antisocial behaviour did not occur 
on the leased property, but away from it. 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
In Mowan v Wandsworth London Borough Council,29 
the plaintiff was a secure tenant of a flat owned by 
the defendant local authority. She exercised a right 
to buy the flat and was assigned a long lease of the 
property. The secure tenant in the flat above suffered 
from mental illness and it was claimed that she 
deliberately made excessive noise at night, had left 
taps running causing flooding to the plaintiff's flat and 
had made threats to kill her. The plaintiff sought an 
injunction restraining the second defendant from 
causing the nuisance and damages from the local 
authority for failure to abate the nuisance even 
thought they were made aware of it. 
The claim was struck out as against the authority 
and, on appeal the plaintiff argued that the common 
law should be reviewed in light of the guarantees of 
private and family life contained in art,8 c '  : - 5  
European Convention on Human Rights. The str - ; 
out of the proceedings, the plaintiff claimed. i t% 2 
breach of art.6 of the Convention governing her rll;-: 
to have access to the courts as it operated as a- 
exclusionary rule. 
The court noted that an occupier of land can be 
held liable for a nuisance created by others if he 
"continues or adopts it" citing Sedleigh-Denfield v 
O'Callaghan.30After noting that common law leans in 
favour of a landlord who is not an occupier in such 
cases the court held that there was no liability in 
n~isance.~'  The court also rejected the claim that the 
council owed a duty of care in negligen~e.~' The 
argument based on the European Convention of 
Human Rights was similarly given short shrift. Gibson 
L.J. stated as follows: 
"I do not accept that there is any breach of 
Article 6(1) of the Convention through English 
law not recognising that a landlord owes a duty 
of care to a tenant in a situation like this. There 
is no exclusionary rule comparable to the 
public policy rule under English law giving 
police investigating crimes immunity from suit 
which was held by the European Court of 
Human Rights in Osman v. United Kingdom 
(1998) 29 E.H.R.R. 245 Mrs. Mowan has 
adequate remedies ... against the tenant 
causing nuisance or against the council by an 
application for judicial review. It is also to be 
borne in mind that English law recognises the 
liability to a tenant of a landlord who directly 
causes or authorises a nuisance, derogates 
from his grant or breaches the tenant's right 
to quiet enjoyment."33 
Essentially, Osman forbids exclusionary rules, i.e. 
rules which confer blanket immunity on a class of 
persons against whom the plaintiff has a cause of 
action. The claim failed as the plaintiff had no cause 
of action as no duty of care had been recognised 
between her and the local authority. Contrast this with 
a situation where a cause of action did exist, but the 
plaintiff was prevented from enforcing it by reason of 
an exclusion or immunity of local authorities from 
liability. 
As the events complained of were prior to the 
passage of the Human Rights Act 1998 (which, as in 
Ireland, does not enjoy retrospectivity) this ground 
was withdrawn. The court declined to "interpret P e  
common law in line with art.8 of the Convention notps 
that "we cannot accept the invitation to bend the 
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common law so that it affords a remedy against the 
council. The principles are too well established for 
that. If they are to be altered, that must happen 
e l~ewhere."~~ 
Criticism of Distinction 
The distinction between the liability in nuisance for a 
tenant's behaviour and a licenseeltresspassers 
behaviour has been criticised. It seems there is no 
conceptual reason why it should be more difficult to 
establish a claim on the basis that the third party 
creating the nuisance was a tenant of the defendant. 
The landlord of tenanted property will often have more 
remedies to end the nuisance at his disposal than in 
cases where the nuisance is caused by acts of 
trespassers. Furthermore, the applicability of the 
Sedleigh-Denfield principle of "continuing or adopting" 
the nuisance to cases involving anti-social behaviour 
has been questioned. One commentator observes 
that: 
"If a property owner knows that the physical 
state of his property might cause harm to 
neighbouring land if he does not rectify it then, 
even if the physical condition came about 
because of the act of a third party, it seems 
fair enough to talk of him 'being responsible' 
for it. It is quite different, however, if the harm 
is caused not by a physical condition created 
by the third party, but the behaviour of the third 
party itself. As noted in the Australian case of 
Smith v. Leurs (1945) 70 CLR 256, at 261: 
'The general rule is that one man is under no 
duty of controlling another to prevent his doing 
damage to a third'."35 
While there is a limit on the "continuation or adoption" 
principle in that it requires "reasonable" steps be taken 
to abate the nuisance, there is still some academic 
concern that it imposes overly onerous obligations 
upon property owners. It will in most cases require 
that a housing authority litigate against third parties. 
In determining whether a local authority has acted 
reasonably, it would also be necessary to consider 
the other statutory obligations of the authority vis-e- 
vie the victims of the nuisance, the neighbourhood 
as a whole, the use of resources and the relationship 
with other enforcement agencies.36 The eviction of a 
nuisance-creator may conflict with a duty to provide 
for Traveller accommodation. A complaint to the 
Gardai may in many cases be a more appropriate 
avenue for the victim to pursue. Furthermore, the 
authority may be reluctant to act as they would simply 
be shifting the problem elsewhere. 
There is also some confusion in the terminology 
used by the courts. Judges will often discuss 
"continuing and adopting the nuisance" in relation to 
the activities of tenants. This is not necessarily 
incompatible with also stating that the landlord must 
have authorised or licensed the activity in some way. 
It is conceivable that conduct which would amount to 
"continuing or adopting" the nuisance complained of 
could also amount to authorising the nuisance. 
However, for tenants, it appears that the landlord must 
have some direct responsibility for the nuisance. 
Acquiescence to a nuisance created by tenants is 
not sufficient to establish a claim against the landlord 
unless the nuisance was known to be an inevitable 
consequence of the letting by him or her. On the other 
hand, even if the nuisance is not expressly authorised 
it may be authorised by implication. 
Acts Which Take Place Away From the Landowners' 
Properfy 
In Hussain v Lancaster City Council,37 one of the 
grounds for the failure of the claim of nuisance was 
that the conduct did not occur through use of the 
tenants land. The acts of vandalism and harassment 
which took place may have been in the 
neighbourhood of the property but this was not 
sufficient to establish the tort. While Hussain 
concerned the local authority's liability for acts of its 
tenants, Lippiatt v South Gloucestershire CounciP8 
concerned the local authorities' liability for the acts of 
Travellers in occupation of their land who were either 
licensees or trespassers. 
In this case, the defendants were seeking to have 
the claim struck out as revealing no cause of action. 
The plaintiffs were farmers with an interests in lands 
situated on either side of a main road. The Travellers 
in question had occupied a large strip of land owned 
by the council on one edge of the road. It was claimed 
that these Travellers had entered onto the plaintiffs' 
land and engaged in numerous acts of anti-social 
behaviour including obstructing access to a 
neighbouring field, leaving rubbish and excrement on 
it, stealing fixtures, damaging a wall and crops and 
permitting their dogs to chase the plaintiffs' sheep. 
Of relevance, was the fact that the council was aware 
of the incursion onto their land for three years prior to 
evicting the Travellers and Evans L.J. noted that: 
"Thereafter, it resolved that it would 'tolerate' 
what it regarded as an unauthorised 
encampment, This went beyond passive 
tolerance, because (mindful no doubt of 
statutory duties which are not relevant to this 
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appeal) it provided toilet, water and other 
facilities for the travellers .. .  from a legal point 
of view, the travellers never became tenants 
of their land, and the council was in 
possession an control of it throughout . . ."39 
The issue of the council's vicarious liability for the 
wrongs of the Travellers was not raised, nor was it 
argued that the council had "adopted" the nuisance. 
Cited in argument was A.G. v C~rke,~O where an 
injunction was granted preventing a landowner from 
allowing occupiers of caravans whom he had 
permitted to use his land from inter alia committing 
acts of trespass in the neighbourhood of the property. 
The basis of the judgment was that the acts 
complained of amounted to a public nuisance and 
gave rise to a danger "to the health of the 
neighbourhood", Applying Rylands v F l e t ~ h e r , ~ ~  the 
court imposed responsibility in law on the defendants 
for acts done in the vicinity of the camp by persons 
the landowner brings onto his land for profit. It was 
also noted that A.G. v Corkecould have been equally 
well decided on the basis that the landowner was in 
possession of the property and was himself liable in 
nuisance for the acts of his licensees.42 A further 
precedent for the proposition that a landowner may 
be legally responsible for the acts of his or her 
licensees which take place off the land was noted. In 
Thompson-Schwab v C ~ s t a k i , ~ ~  the defendants were 
operating a brothel in premises adjoining that of the 
plaintiff. An injunction was granted against using he 
premises for the purposes of prostitution which was 
upheld by the Court of Appeal. While there was no 
material interference with the piaintiff's property, the 
activities complained of were held to constitute a 
"sensible interference with comfort and convenient 
enjoyment" of the residence. Such acts, it was held, 
could constitute a private nuisance.44 
In order to constitute a private nuisance there would 
normally be some form of emanation from the 
defendant's land such as noise, dirt, fumes, vibrations 
etc, but Thomson-Schwab establishes that conduct 
on the defendant's land may be so offensive as to 
amount to an actionable nuisance, although it has 
been held that this is a relatively rare oc~u r rence .~~  
Having considered this line of authority Evans L.J. 
noted that in Page Motors "no attention was paid to 
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place on or off the defendant's land" and held ',r-er 
that: 
"In my judgment, the facts alleged in Hussa~n's 
case . . . were materially different from those 
in the present case. The disturbance 
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